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6 February 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: SA/DCI

SUBJECT: Meeting with Assistant Secretary of State and
Director, INR, 7 February 1986

1. You are scheduled to lunch with Assistant Secretary of State
Armacost and Director, INR Abramowitz on 7 February 1986 at 1200 hours
in the DCI Dining Room.

2. The following agenda items have been coordinated with
Department of State:

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NIO/USSR
4 February 1986Soviet Problems in PDRY

Moscow is now probably anxious about the prospect of a prolonged conflict bearing significant political and economic cost. The Soviets want to gain quick recognition for the rebel government and end foreign support for Hasani as soon as possible. Soviet handling of the conflict so far has been awkward and mistaken:

Despite their substantial advisory role in the PDRY, the Soviets may have been tactically caught by surprise at the start.

They initially backed Hasani and attempted to negotiate a solution; their brokerage came to nought and Hasani now appears deeply hostile to the Soviets.

In militarily intervening on the side of the rebels initially, the Soviets probably believed they they were providing generally gratuitous support that would gain them leverage with a new government that would win shortly.

They now face the possibility of a prolonged conflict in which the loyalist side may have much regional support and, if successful would move to curtail, if not oust, Moscow's substantial political-military presence.

Qadhafi reportedly is supporting Hasani and seeking to stiffen Sanaa's will to do so. Ethiopia sought to lend aid to Hasani and then cut this effort short due to Soviet pressure, undermining first Soviet control over the situation and then Mengistu's credibility. Moscow's heavy hand on Mengistu will not go unnoticed.

The conservative Arab Gulf states believe to varying degrees that the Soviets were party to a coup attempt against Hasani and may slow or freeze their developing relations with Moscow for some time.

States such as Iraq and Algeria will likely draw further practical lessons about how the Soviets deal with Third World friends.

Strategically for Moscow, a protracted insurgency in the PDRY would add a Middle East dimension to those conflicts going on in Angola, Nicaragua, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. It would also be a blow to Soviet hopes that the Gorbachev leadership can avoid reverses like those that befell the late Brezhnev era and quickly alter the correlation of forces to Soviet favor.

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The above Soviet record and a prolonged imbroglio in the PDRY could work against Gorbachev's personal luster.

Gorbachev and Shevardnadze could use these events to do some intended housecleaning in Secretariat Departments and the Foreign Ministry. Those responsible for previously favoring the return of Ismail to the PDRY might be scapegoated.

Clearly the Soviets would like the conflict to end quickly with a rebel victory or a negotiated agreement in which Moscow could be sure it would retain its assets. But the rebels may not have the military wherewithal and, in the short term, the Soviets may not have enough on the ground themselves--for example, functional aircraft--to lend a decisive hand if they were to countenance this. Moscow's primary goals in the meantime will be to induce/threaten North Yemen to end its aid to the loyalists and gain recognition for the rebels.

At the same time, the Soviets want badly to minimize regional and world attention to their involvement in the conflict.

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The upside for the Soviets of a near-term rebel victory would be:

The rebels would be dependent on the Soviets, while to get to this point the Soviets probably also would have gained sway over North Yemen and Ethiopia, thus demonstrating Moscow's regional influence.

The Gorbachev regime would be on record as willing to use military force and pressure to determine the outcome of a Third World conflict in which it has a big stake, where it has the ability, and at least if the risk of military conflict with the US is small.

The Soviets may have intended their intervention to have a secondary effect of helping to deter a US decision to strike at one of its clients in the future and thus be seen as more positive in the more important context of US-Soviet rivalry. Together with its boost in aid to various other clients during the last year, this intervention is powerful testimony that the Gorbachev leadership has no intention of backing off from the Third World or reducing its commitments.

Developments in US-Soviet Bilaterals

Secretary Shultz has been meeting with Dobrynin approximately every two weeks since Geneva. Shultz anticipates two meetings with Shevardnadze

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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

NIC 00627-86
6 February 1986

National Intelligence Council

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

FROM: Robert D. Vickers, Jr.
National Intelligence Officer for Latin America

SUBJECT: CPPG Meeting on Haiti

1. On 6 February 1986 [redacted] 25X1
I attended a CPPG meeting on Haiti, chaired by Don Fortier, Deputy Assistant to the President for Policy Development/NSC. I gave a brief intelligence overview which made the following points:

- The situation was currently quiet, but Carnival is scheduled to begin tomorrow, and Duvalier probably is concerned the situation could get out of hand. If he attempts to prevent large-scale celebrations, it could lead to violence, but conversely, the traditional boisterous crowds could resort to rioting.
- Thus, Duvalier appears to be preparing for a possible hasty departure, and is seeking potential asylum abroad.
- The opposition remains weak and disorganized, and the most likely successor to Duvalier, should he depart soon, is a military junta with some possible civilian participation.
- Duvalier's departure is likely to touch off widespread celebrations, with some looting and other indiscriminate violence. In addition, there may be some fighting among the Army and militia (VSN) over who would succeed Duvalier.
- We have no evidence that Cuba is preparing to send trained Haitian exile forces into the country should prolonged chaos result, but the possibility cannot be excluded.

2. Elliott Abrams, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, followed with a diplomatic status report:

- The Haitian Foreign Minister has asked the United States to help arrange asylum for Duvalier, and has requested a US plane to flee the country.

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- US demarches to Francophone countries about possible asylum had been turned down by all but Togo. France still has not responded but will do so later today.
- The US fears that Duvalier may leave precipitously on his own as early as tonight, before we can arrange asylum or make contacts about a successor government.
- We are reluctant to begin organizing a successor government until we are sure if and when Duvalier will leave.
- Meanwhile, we have to be prepared for a hasty use of military force to protect American lives and help keep order.

3. General Moellering from the JCS then spoke about the status of military contingency planning:

- He said we would need 4 to 7 days to plan and mobilize a large occupation force of several active divisions and reserve civil affairs units.
- A smaller evacuation force of amphibious ships and transport aircraft could be sent more quickly if unopposed by armed resistance.
- Abrams and I responded that the situation was not like the Dominican Republic, and that we did not anticipate that a large, well-armed force would oppose a US military presence, particularly for evacuation purposes. Abrams added that we might be requested to intervene by the Haitian Army, and that we may do so in conjunction with the French.

4. It was decided that:

- We would attempt to prevent Duvalier's leaving--should he chose to do so--until we could help arrange a transition government.
- If France turns Duvalier's request for asylum down, we would ask President Reagan about letting him come here, but this was not a preferred option.

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- We would provide a plane if necessary, but hopefully not to bring him to the United States.
- We would contact the French about a possible joint evacuation/peacekeeping force, which hopefully would be of minimal size.



Robert D. Vickers

cc: DCI
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VC/NIC (Fuller)

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EXDIS

FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY ABRAMS FROM AMBASSADOR

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PINS, MOPS, HA, JM, US
SUBJECT: PRIME MINISTER SEAGA'S VIEWS ON HAITIAN
SITUATION

1. (SECRET-ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. SEAGA CALLED ME TO JAMAICA HOUSE THIS MORNING TO
DISCUSS ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS FOR THE SITUATION IN HAITI
AND TO SOLICIT OUR VIEWS. I PROMISED TO GIVE HIM OUR
REACTION BY EARLY AFTERNOON, WHEN HE EXPECTS ANOTHER
CALL FROM HIS PERSONAL EMISSARY IN HAITI, MINISTER OF
SOCIAL SECURITY NEVILLE GALLIMORE.

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3. ACCORDING TO GALLIMORE, WHO ARRIVED IN PORT AU PRINCE YESTERDAY AT THE INVITATION OF MRS. DUVALIER'S SISTER, THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF THE SITUATION ARE AS FOLLOWS:

-- THE DUVALIER FAMILY IS SERIOUSLY CONSIDERING LEAVING THE COUNTRY (THEY ARE INTERESTED IN JAMAICA AS A POSSIBLE PLACE OF ASYLUM);

-- TODAY WILL BE THE CRITICAL DAY. DUVALIER BELIEVES HE CAN HOLD ON IF BUSINESSES OPEN UP AND SITUATION BEGINS TO SUBSIDE. HE REALIZES HE CANNOT HOLD ON IN THE FACE OF CONTINUING COUNTRYWIDE DISRUPTIONS;

-- THE ARMY IS SPLIT IN SEVERAL FACTIONS. "THERE ARE THREE GENERALS WHO DON'T EVEN TALK TO EACH OTHER."

4. SEAGA IS WILLING TO DISCUSS ASYLUM FOR THE DUVALIERS IN JAMAICA, AT LEAST ON AN INTERIM BASIS AS WAS DONE WITH MAGLOIRE IN THE 1960'S, BUT ONLY REPEAT ONLY ON CONDITION THAT SOME SORT OF CONTINUITY MECHANISM PROMISING AN IMPROVEMENT IN THE OVERALL SITUATION IS PUT IN PLACE FOLLOWING DUVALIER'S DEPARTURE. THE PRIME MINISTER DISCUSSED TWO OPTIONS HE CONSIDERS POSSIBLE:

(A) INSERTION OF SOME SORT OF OAS SPONSORED TEAM, AT THE REQUEST OF DUVALIER, AS THE COUNTRY'S CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY, TO PROVIDE TRANSITIONAL ORDER WHILE MORE LASTING ARRANGEMENTS ARE WORKED OUT (SEAGA THINKS THIS WOULD BE CUMBERSOME AND LIKELY INEFFECTUAL); OR

(B) A "GRENADA-TYPE SOLUTION," AGAIN UPON DUVALIER'S REQUEST, INVOLVING THE U.S. AND BLACK CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES WHICH WOULD SECURE ORDER AND OVERSEE A COMPLETE TRANSITIONAL PROCESS INCLUDING A CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY, A NEW CONSTITUTION ETC. (A PROCESS HE BELIEVES COULD TAKE 2-3 YEARS).

5. SEAGA STRESSED THAT HIS CONCERN OVER THE EVOLVING SITUATION WAS BASED ON THE HIGH PROBABILITY OF CONTINUED DISORDER AND BLOODSHED, AND THE PROXIMITY OF THE CUBANS, WHO WOULD BE PERFECTLY PLACED TO FISH IN

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TROUBLED WATERS.

6. SEAGA WOULD LIKE OUR VIEWS ON (A) AND (B) ASAP. I PROMISED ONLY THAT I WOULD PASS HIS VIEWS IMMEDIATELY TO WASHINGTON FOR CONSIDERATION. I POINTED OUT THE DOMESTIC POLITICAL PITFALLS AND EXTERNAL PERCEPTION PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN PROVIDING ASYLUM FOR DUVALIER. I ALSO POINTED OUT THAT ANY "GRENADA-TYPE" SOLUTION WOULD BE DANGEROUS SINCE THE REACTION OF THE ARMED MILITIA AND ARMY COULD NOT BE PREDICTED, ESPECIALLY IF SUCH INTERVENTION WERE REQUESTED BY AN EXITING DUVALIER.

7. ACTION REQUESTED:

WASHINGTON'S REACTION TO THE ABOVE BY EARLY AFTERNOON, WHEN SEAGA EXPECTS TO BE IN TOUCH WITH GALLIMORE AGAIN. HE HAS PROMISED TO KEEP ME INFORMED ABOUT WHAT HE LEARNS FROM GALLIMORE, WHICH I WILL PASS ON TO THE DEPARTMENT AS SOON AS RECEIVED.

8. PORT AU PRINCE MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.
SOTIRHOS

END OF MESSAGE

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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

NIC #00482-86
29 January 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: Carl W. Ford, Jr.
National Intelligence Officer for East Asia

SUBJECT: A Marcos Victory and the Insurgency -- Time is Crucial

1. A Marcos victory in the 7 February election seems almost certain. It also appears likely that it will be perceived in both the Philippines and the US as having been won by fraud and intimidation. We cannot, of course, rule out an Aquino upset, the President's health failing under the pressures of campaigning during the last week, or the several other uncertainties surrounding the election. But, all signs suggest that Marcos will remain in power come 8 February, but with a tarnished mandate. Accordingly, it seems prudent to assess the consequences of such an outcome for the ongoing Communist insurgency and suggest actions you may want to take to protect US interests that are at risk.

2. The most serious consequence, but probably the least likely, is a violent polarization of the society with a rapid increase in the power and influence of the CPP/NPA. Many Filipinos apparently see the election as the last chance for democratic constitutional change. Public and widespread outrage caused by the perception of a stolen election could result in serious civil disturbances, massive defections to political forces on the left, including the Communists, and conditions easily manipulated by the CPP/NPA to their advantage. In the chaos, the Communists might even be able to seize power directly or indirectly.

3. A more likely outcome is a gradual but steady decline of the government's position over the next year with an accompanying boost to the fortunes of the CPP/NPA. A Marcos victory alone might increase the villages under Communist influence by 10 percent or more, uping their total to as high as 40 percent. Moreover, it seems conceivable by year's end that the Communists could gain control of one out of every two villages in the countryside, bring the insurgency to all major cities, and be close to going on what they call the strategic offensive nationwide.

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4. Even if Marcos wins a relatively clean election and avoids serious domestic upheaval, time is quickly running out. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] the government would reach a point of no return where the insurgent threat would no longer be susceptible to economic and political levers and become essentially a military struggle--one that the AFP is in poor shape to wage. [REDACTED]

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5. Equally worrisome is the virtually unanimous opinion of analysts throughout the intelligence community that Marcos may not be prepared [REDACTED] to move decisively on implementing a comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy. Other considerations, such as the local elections and political power maneuvering, could take up much of his time and attention. Moreover, his health continues to deteriorate making it difficult for him to tackle all the pressing problems facing the Philippines. Analysts also note that Marcos may feel under much less pressure in the post election time period to take US advice and guidance. All in all, the prospects for initiating an effective counterinsurgency plan do not look good.

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6. Even if Marcos should die within the next year, it does not greatly alter the bleak prognosis. His death will lead to a certain degree of instability even under the best of circumstances and time will be lost if he lingers on for a while. Moreover, it will take any new government some amount of time before it is sufficiently organized to undertake major new initiatives.

7. Finally, a Marcos victory will almost certainly trigger a divisive policy debate in the US featuring radically different policy prescriptions for the dilemmas we face in the Philippines. Some within the Congress and the media will demand that we walk away from Marcos and, at a minimum, will surely make it more difficult to provide assistance to a Marcos government. They will be aided and abetted by individuals in the Executive Branch, particularly at State, who will advocate distancing the US from Marcos. Moreover, there well could be a major split between Shultz and Weinberger on how the US should react. Any of these developments will complicate and delay a US response to the problem.

8. In such circumstances, only the direct intervention of the President forcefully endorsing a major initiative in support of the Marcos government soon after the election can hope to short circuit delays and push through a positive post election strategy. [REDACTED]

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9. We no longer have the luxury of considering the Philippines as just another bureaucratic problem. The stakes are high and time is rapidly disappearing. Within 12-18 months, we could be confronted with a decision to either intervene militarily, including the possibility of sending U.S. combat troops, or stand by while communist insurgents overwhelm government forces. The crisis is upon us. Do we dare hesitate, hoping that things will get better? Unless we are prepared to take more decisive action to protect our vital interests now, things can only get worse. Even if I am wrong, and I recognize you have questions about my judgment on the Philippines, a failure to act only guarantees that the President's options and flexibility will be narrowed over time. Why wait until all our alternatives are of the most extreme nature.

Carl Ford
Carl W. Ford, Jr.

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**NIC #00482-86
29 January 1986**

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: Carl W. Ford, Jr.
National Intelligence Officer for East Asia

SUBJECT: A Marcos Victory and the Insurgency -- Time is Crucial

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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

NIC #00476-86
29 January 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: Carl W. Ford, Jr.
National Intelligence Officer for East Asia

SUBJECT: Moderate Opposition's Naivete on Dealing with the
Insurgency

1. Although it is unlikely that Aquino will win the 7 February presidential election, her views on military topics and plans for countering the insurgency are worrisome enough for you to take special note of and hopefully begin to correct. Thus far, she has not developed a detailed plan for meeting the insurgent threat, but has commented on several aspects of her overall approach to the problem.

2. The most comprehensive presentation appeared in her social policy speech delivered in Davao City, Mindanao, on January 16. The basics of her program included:

- An immediate cease fire.
- Release of political prisoners; and
- A dialogue with the insurgents ("in order to afford the new administration the opportunity to immediately redress their legitimate grievances").

[REDACTED] "Cory" chose to treat the insurgency as a "social problem" and notes that the speech envisions a solution where the money to be saved by the cessation of military counterinsurgency operations would be redirected to improving social services. On other occasions, Aquino has suggested that the Communist Party should be legalized and is prepared to accept Communists into her government if they disavow violence.

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3. Especially troubling is the omission of a counterinsurgency strategy from the opposition's "unity agreement" entitled "Minimum Program of Government" (see attachment). In fact, the only specific mention of military matters appears in the "Social and Cultural Program Section," which promises to "repeal the National Service Law (PD1770) and make corresponding amendments in the National Defense Act." It goes on to present an analysis of the insurgency as stemming from "social" causes. It states that:

"In the interest of the national reconciliation and solidarity, general amnesty shall be granted by the new leadership to all political detainees and all political offenders who will disavow the use of violence to achieve political ends. Likewise, it shall take steps, immediately upon assumption of office, to redress the legislative grievances of those who have resorted to armed struggle."

4. More recently, Aquino, attempting to rebut charges that she is soft on communism, spoke out more forcefully on the insurgency. The key elements of her statement included:

- Grant amnesty to all political detainees and all political offenders who foreswear the use of violence against the state.
- Attacked Marcos's record on the insurgency indicating that the number of insurgents had grown alarmingly under his leadership.
- Promised to seek a political solution as Magsaysay had done.
- Analyzed the insurgency as being an economic, social, military and ideological problem.
- Determined to restore the morale and professionalism of the AFP by retiring all of the overstaying generals.
- Would use the power of the state to fight any force, communist or not, seeking to overthrow democratic government, but adding that she would respect the right of a communist, or anybody else, to sell his ideas peacefully to others.

5. Despite the tougher talk, the soft headed thinking on the insurgency presented by Aquino during the campaign appears to be her true assessment of the problem and not merely campaign rhetoric. She apparently accepts the conventional wisdom of many in the opposition that:

- Most members of the NPA are not really communists; and
- If you get rid of Marcos and institute a program of social justice, improve the economy and expand land reform, the insurgency will gradually wither away.

Consequently, military requirements get short shrift in her program because she envisions that they will not be necessary.

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6. Admittedly, an Aquino victory is likely to usher in a honeymoon period that would initially undermine CPP/NPA expansion. Also, real progress on a broad based reform program could seriously handicap Communist recruitment activities. But, the CPP/NPA, at a minimum, would use this initial period to consolidate its gains, step up military and political training activities and seek to infiltrate the new government. The party, also, almost certainly believes that a new government would find it difficult to achieve major gains on its agenda of promises quickly and would be preparing to go on the offensive again once the honeymoon period began to wear off.

7. Consequently, an important question is whether or not Mrs. Aquino understands the military dimension of the Communist threat and has the toughness to make hard decisions on challenging the insurgents. Unfortunately, on both counts the judgment as of today, I am afraid, is no. I do not believe she will take full advantage of the honeymoon period to prepare for the military challenge that the Communists are sure to mount after her election and she will emphasize talk and political solutions with little appreciation of how the CPP/NPA will seek to take advantage of her inexperience to build their strength for an eventual showdown.

8. Part of the problem appears to be Mrs. Aquino's advisors. None of them have a military background or understand the full dimensions of the Communist threat. Those that she listens to most on this problem apparently are priests and social theorists who fundamentally mistrust the military and abhor violence. Some may even be sympathetic with the insurgent cause. Unless she hears the other side of the argument and begins to appreciate the full dimensions of the military problem facing the Philippines, the US could be in for trouble if she somehow won the election.

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Carl W. Ford, Jr.

Attachment

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NIC #00476-86
29 January 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: Carl W. Ford, Jr.
National Intelligence Officer for East Asia

SUBJECT: Moderate Opposition's Naivete on Dealing with the
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Talking Points for the DCI

The 27th Soviet Party Congress

The Soviet party congress that convenes on 25 February will be an important milestone in Gorbachev's consolidation of power and, judging from the preliminary evidence, a meeting quite unlike the last one held in 1981.

This congress will include the traditional agenda items:

- A review by the General Secretary of Soviet foreign and domestic policies over the past five years and an assessment of present and future requirements
- A report from the Premier on the basic guidelines for the next five-year economic plan
- The "election" of a new Central Committee and Central Auditing Commission

This time, however, judging from the republic party congresses now being held, Gorbachev will be presiding over a congress that will be highly critical of past economic performance and of the policy drift that prevailed under Brezhnev.

- criticism of Brezhnev, including the "personality cult" that surrounded him, will be a major theme of Gorbachev's speech. 25X1
- In Kirgizia, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan the previous party chiefs have been attacked by name, and at last week's city conference in Moscow, the criticism of Politburo member and former Moscow party chief Grishin was very thinly veiled.
- The available texts of speeches from the republic party congresses indicate a marked decline in flattering references to the General Secretary--a trend that presumably reflects Gorbachev's reported distaste for Brezhnev-era obsequiousness.

The guidelines for the 12th five-year plan (1986-90), previously released in draft form, also will echo familiar Gorbachev themes --the acceleration of economic growth through the modernization of industry, reduction of waste, and increased worker effort.

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Gorbachev probably will emphasize the need to make more progress on arms control and to build on the improvement in US-Soviet relations resulting from his meeting with President Reagan in Geneva.

--He could use the Congress to issue some new proposals in that area, although the range of domestic issues to be dealt with probably makes this a less likely possibility.

In contrast to the last party congress, when only about 20 percent of the membership in the Central Committee and Central Auditing Commission was replaced, this congress is expected to approve a turnover of at least 40 percent.

-- This high turnover in the party's "leading organs" will tighten Gorbachev's grasp on the levers of power and reinforce his authority.

The most unusual business to be conducted at this congress will be approval of revisions in the party program--left untouched for 25 years--and rules.

-- The new party program, approved in draft at the October 1985 plenum, will replace the embarrassingly unrealistic objectives espoused by Khrushchev with more general language that gives the leadership maximum flexibility to pursue a wide range of policy options.

-- This document, too, bears Gorbachev's strong imprint and reportedly was held up by revisions he ordered in a draft that was nearly completed when he became General Secretary.

Finally, the Congress also may see a number of additional changes in the leadership that will help complete the "changing of the guard."

-- The change that seems most certain is the removal from the Politburo of Viktor Grishin, a Brezhnevite who recently lost his job as Moscow party boss.

-- Boris Yel'tsin, Grishin's successor in Moscow, is rumored to be in line for full membership in the Politburo. If he should keep his membership in the Secretariat, Yel'tsin would join Gorbachev and Ligachev as the only leaders who hold that coveted dual status.

-- Another likely candidate for promotion is Vsevolod Murakhovskiy, a First Deputy Premier and chairman of the new State Agro-industrial Committee

-- Leaders whose positions are currently rumored to be

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shaky include Politburo members Aliyev, Kunayev, and Shcherbitskiy, candidate Politburo members Kuznetsov and Ponomarev and party secretaries Rusakov and Zimyanin.

While the Congress almost certainly will strengthen Gorbachev's position, he still may be facing considerable opposition on some issues--even from recent appointees.

--For example, Ligachev--Gorbachev's second-in-command who presumably has played a strong role in recent personnel changes--has expressed little enthusiasm for Gorbachev's management reform efforts, placing greater emphasis on the need for increased discipline.

--Recent articles in the Soviet press suggest that Gorbachev's apparent support for a limited expansion of the private sector in agriculture and the services area also has encountered opposition.

Indicators that Gorbachev is overcoming some of the footdragging and opposition he has faced in the past could include:

--An announcement of a comprehensive management reform program that would include the consolidation of related ministries and agencies in construction, transportation, and other sectors

--The addition of a new provision in the party rules--which Gorbachev reportedly favors but has been unable to push through--that would limit the tenure of party officials.

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DCI/NIO Regional
NIO/EA
05 February 1986

Emerging Dilemma for US Policy Towards Political Transition in South Korea

1. During the run up to the scheduled 1988 leadership transition in Seoul, the already narrow path for US policymakers will become more difficult to traverse. Without a clear understanding of the pitfalls lining the path, we could trigger events that would be counterproductive to our long range objectives.

2. The principal pitfalls are:

- Appearing to give Chun unqualified support while being ambivalent on the need for an orderly transfer of power in 1988 would cause the opposition to react violently and anti-Americanism to grow.
- Decidedly backing away from Chun, possibly citing a moral imperative for a democratic transition, which could drive Chun to turn inward and hang on to power, and/or cause the military to oust him in an effort to ensure stability and the continuation of a viable US-Korean relationship.

3. To avoid these pitfalls, US policymakers need to be sensitive to how US statements and actions will be perceived in Korea. Even pro forma US statements of support for Chun risk being read as endorsements of his staying on by many in the South already predisposed to see a US hand in his activities. Clearer US affirmations of the need for a transfer of power in 1988, for example, may be looked for, particularly if Chun's currently tough approach to his political opposition reinforces the notion that he does not intend to step down. Others around him, including the senior military leadership, share that concern [redacted] as do his antagonists in the opposition camp, his critics in the media, and the man in the street.

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4. On the other hand, visibly backing away from Chun also would be dangerous. Chun, by virtually all accounts, already is widely unpopular. As 1988 approaches, we do not expect that image to change and believe that tensions will rise as the expected date for a transfer of power approaches. A clear slackening of US support would stir the already agitated opposition and students to increase violence. If the military believes Chun has lost the mantle of heaven and his continuation in office is the cause of the political instability, they could intervene to protect the security relationship with the US.

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5. The pattern of events in 1985 suggests that the US will be an important target for any demonstrations and pressure tactics used by the opposition against Chun in the next 2 years.

- Attacking the US has proven to be an effective way for the more radical elements of the anti-Chun movement, as well as the more moderate segments of the opposition, to get at the President, enabling them to mobilize nationalist sentiment and to capitalize on the mythology that the US is the ultimate prop for any South Korean military regime.
- The depth of Chun's unpopularity and his close identification with the US over the last five years have made some Koreans look more closely at the US relationship. Critics of the President in South Korea also recognize that they can find a sympathetic ear by playing up the alleged role of US influence.

6. Negotiating the potential minefield in South Korea over the next two years requires carefully calibrating our initiatives and responses to Korea, and avoiding either extreme. This includes:

- Stressing the importance of a predictable transition of power in 1988; and
- At the same time, defusing the already growing perception of many in South Korea that the US is trying to manipulate the course of events in the South.

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South Korea: Warning Signs of Political Change (S NF)

An Intelligence Assessment

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*EA 85-10224
December 1985*

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25X1**South Korea:
Warning Signs
of Political Change**

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Key Judgments*Information available
as of 6 December 1985
was used in this report.*

Over the past 10 months, the political opposition to President Chun has become more vigorous, student protests more radical, and South Korea's economy more troubled than at any time in the last several years. Opposition behavior since parliamentary elections last February has provoked Chun—after a brief period of greater tolerance—to return to an aggressive posture toward dissent. This has led to a cycle of political action and reaction reminiscent of the late 1970s, and causes us concern about stability in South Korea.

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Broad-based opposition that involved antigovernment demonstrations, with workers joining students in the streets, would pose the greatest danger to Chun. In the current climate, we believe a controversial action by Seoul—for example, harsh measures to quiet the campuses or martial law—could bring these groups and other antigovernment elements together. So, too, could developments beyond Chun's direct control, such as a protracted economic slowdown or a major corruption scandal. If such developments emerged to unify the opposition in a violent, large-scale confrontation with the government, historical precedent argues that some element of the Army leadership would step in to restore order, citing national security concerns, and almost certainly remove Chun in the process.

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We believe the possibility of serious trouble will increase with the approach of 1988, when Chun has promised to step down. In our view, any widespread perception that Chun is reneging on his promise—recent reports that he is having second thoughts are worrisome—or pursuing an obviously flawed succession strategy, could bring an early test of strength with the opposition and perhaps a preemptive power grab by would-be successors.

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Despite the growing number of warning signs, we still believe that massive civil strife or succession-by-coup can be avoided:

- In the short run, Chun has considerable strengths and some advantages, including his powerful internal security apparatus, public recognition of the threat that political instability poses to continued economic progress, and the reluctance of senior military leaders to intervene except in the most extreme circumstances.

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- Chun also has some political and policy options that could ameliorate the destabilizing effects of the political competition facing him and his opponents over the next two years. In particular, a more constructive approach to student dissent and efforts to defuse the tensions of the succession process would help prevent further polarization. [REDACTED]

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We are not optimistic, however, that Chun will display the flexibility and conciliation needed to ease political tensions and to fashion a leadership transition that his opponents, the populace, and the Army can accept. [REDACTED]

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